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LICENSES, TRADEMARKS, AND BANKRUPTCY,
OH MY!: TRADEMARK LICENSING AND
THE PERILS OF LICENSOR
BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION

The current complexity of bankruptcy law creates a formidable
forest through which businesses with trademark licenses' must
1. Trademark licensing involves a contract between the owner of a trademark and another business. The owner allows another to utilize the owner's
trademark in connection with his own business, as long as the parties meet certain requirements. This relationship is generally governed by the Lanham Act,
a federal statute which regulates trademark law. 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988). The
licensor must control the licensee with respect to the nature and quality of the
goods or services connected with the trademark, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988), and the
trademark must not be used in such a way as to deceive the public, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1055 (1988). There are two conditions involved when businesses comply with
the Lanham Act's requirement of preventing public deception. The first condition is that the businesses must maintain the uniformity of the product they
produce under the mark "regardless of which of the related companies manufactures or distributes the goods." Ronald B. Coolley, Related Company: The
Required Relationshipin Trademark Licensing, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 299, 305
(1987). The basis for this requirement is that the trademark performs its intended function only if it represents the guaranty of its owner that the product
conforms to its own standards of quality. Id. The second condition is that the
trademark owner must be sufficiently vigilant to ensure that there is no deterioration in the product's quality. Id. The licensor usually protects against infringement, and must continually allow the licensee to use the trademark. See
generally, 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrTON

§§ 18:13 - 18:14 (2d ed. 1984).
More recently, the business community has developed three new forms of
licensing: merchandising, collateral product licensing, and character licensing.
See Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing: Towards a More Flexible Standard,78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 646 (1988). Marks argues that the many ways in
which businesses are expanding require a new look at the legal system's protections, because the trademark laws concerning quality control have not caught
up with the realities of business practices. Id. at 647-48.
A typical license should describe in detail the following: (a) the mark involved; (b) the goods or services that relate to the licensee's use of the mark; (c)
the standards of quality for the goods or services; (d) the methods of supervision
and control; (e) any limitations of territory, sublicensing, or the sale of competing goods; (f) the duration of the license and reversion of all rights after termination; and (g) the termination of the rights of both parties for breach of the
license agreement. BEVERLY W. PATrISHALL & DAVID C. HILLARD, TRADE-

MARKS § 4.05 at 148 (1987).
The following two examples of a trademark license are typical of licensing
agreements. In the first example, an owner of a trademark for men's apparel
grants a licensee an exclusive license to use the EXECUTIVE trademark on its
neckties. The necktie manufacturer's clothing is thus part of the "package" for
a line of menswear that the licensor is developing. The licensor coordinates the
color and style of the neckties in order to guarantee the same idea that the
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carefully tread. A trademark owner's inept management or financial instability may force another business to lose its rights under a
trademark license. For example, a business may license its trademark to a product manufacturer or distributor for use on collateral
goods 2 which supplement the trademark owner's product. Alternatively, a t-shirt or pajama manufacturer may license a famous cartoon character exclusively for a sport team or entertainment
company. If, however, the trademark owner files for bankruptcy
after entering into the licensing agreement, it can reject the license
agreement pursuant to existing bankruptcy law.3 Rejection extinguishes the right of the other business, the licensee, to use the
4
trademark often with devastating consequences.
Trademarks are symbols used to identify and distinguish prodlicensor created for its line of menswear. Before production, the licensor exam.
ines and approves the patterns the licensee chooses. The agreement provides
that the licensee may not use the trademark on any item that contains an unapproved design or material. The agreement may require the licensee to submit
the labels, advertising, stationery, invoices, and other materials for licensor approval. Cf.In re Rooster, Inc., 100 B.R. 228 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
In the second example of a typical licensing agreement, a trademark owner
that uses a mark KING on rayon yarn, permits another corporation to use the
trademark on fabrics made from its yarn. The licensee purchases the yarn from
the licensor, and a previously specified testing bureau approves the fabrics
made from the yarn. The licensee can use the representation of the mark or
'ing Tested Quality" on labels, stickers, tags, or other forms of identification
on the fabrics. The license may also require that the licensor control the form
of the methods of identification. Cf. Crown Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose
Corp., 145 F.2d 246 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
Franchise agreements are more complex than licensing agreements.
Franchise agreements offer franchisees a complete method of doing business.
Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 970 (1981). The franchisee pays "for the right to become a part of a system
whose business methods virtually guarantee his success." Id. It is unrealistic to
view a franchise as a mere trademark license. Id. See generally I McCARTHY,
supra,§ 18:22, at 851-55. The franchisor not only grants a trademark license but
often "controls, and leases to the franchisee, the real estate premises used by
the franchisee. In addition, the franchisor almost always is the primary, even
exclusive supplier of the franchisee's principal sale item." Malone v. Crown
Central Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306, 309 (D. Md. 1979). This comment's
proposal is aimed at licensing arrangements only and does not discuss franchise
rejection in bankruptcy. See generally Midas Int'l Corp. v. M & E Enters. (In re
M & E Enters.), 23 B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (termination of automobile
service shop franchise).
2. "Collateral goods" are goods on which the trademark owner has not
used a trademark but which are reasonably similar in nature to the goods on
which the trademark owner has used the mark. Furthermore, collateral goods
may include goods a consumer would use in connection with other goods. See
Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, Merchandising Revisited, 76
TRADEmAIC REP. 271, 274 (1986). For example, in 1981 Winnebago Industries
began licensing the WINNEBAGO mark for sleeping bags, tents, and other outdoor camping gear although Winnebago Industries primarily used the mark for
recreational vehicles. Id,
3. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
4. Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato
Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990).
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ucts. 5 Trademark licensing is common for businesses wishing to expand their markets.6 The promise of large rewards 7 associated with
the good will s of popular trademarks lures other businesses into licensing arrangements with trademark owners. Trademark owners
allow these other businesses to place the owners' trademark on
their own goods. Thus, the licensees profit from the trademark
5. Scott W. Putney, Bankruptcy Code v. Lanham Act and Controlled Licensing, 80 T iADEMA
REP. 140, 140 (1990). The definition of "trademark"
under Section 45 of the Lanham Act is, "any word, name, symbol, or device or
any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
6. In 1986, the volume of merchandising activity had grown by several
hundred percent from 1980. See Battersby & Grimes, supra note 2, at 275.
American Greetings, one of the largest greeting card companies in the world,
teamed up with General Mills' toy operations and successfully marketed the
STRAWBERRY SHORTCAKE character. Id. at 273-74. Furthermore, in 1985,
The Coca-Cola Company authorized Murjani International, Ltd. to design and
manufacture COCA-COLA apparel which grossed an estimated $100 million.
Marks, supra note 1, at 647.
7. Consumers rely on trademarks in making purchasing decisions. Comment, Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Contro 1968 DuKE L.J.
875. Because of this reliance by consumers, a company using a well-known
trademark through a licensing agreement can expect to draw a large amount of
income. For example, it was estimated that the retail sales of STAR WARS and
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK merchandise exceeded $1.5 billion since the
release of the original motion picture. Battersby & Grimes, supra note 2, at 273
n.7. Furthermore, UCLA earned nearly $500,000 in licensing royalties in 1986.
Id. at 272. The Battersby & Grimes article notes that a manufacturer who takes
a license under a widely recognized trademark, with little or no capital investment, is able to distinguish immediately his products from those of his competition. Battersby & Grimes, supra note 2, at 273.
8. "Good will" is the "favorable consideration shown by the purchasing
public to goods known to emanate from a particular source." 1 McCARTHY,
supranote 1, § 2:8, at 32. Good will is not a tangible or physical object that one
can see or feel, but is instead in the minds of the buying public. Id. Good will is
a business value reflecting the basic human propensity to continue doing business with a company that has offered goods or services which the customer likes
and has found adequate for his needs. Id. Good will includes good credit, honesty, reliability, or even technical efficiency. 1 RUDOLF CALLmANN, THE LAW
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 1.11, at 36 (1981).
Good will is the reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past satisfactory dealings and identification. EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914).
Congress did not intend to establish an open market in trademarks that are
not associated with any particular goods and consequently enacted a good will
requirement for licensing and assignments to prevent such an open market.
Patterson Lab., Inc. v. Roman Cleanser Co. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 802
F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1986). The right to a particular mark derives from its use
in connection with an established business or trade. Sheila's Shine Prods., Inc.
v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1973). "There is no such thing as
property in a trademark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed." 1 McCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 2:7, at 28. A trademark, however, may be more than a mere
symbol of good will. The mark itself may be an instrument for creating good
will. Id.
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owners' established reputation for quality, or good will. 9
If a licensee's entire business, however, depends on a trademark license, 10 the owner's rejection may destroy the licensee's
business. Rejection of the licensing agreement causes the licensee
to forfeit its right to use the trademark regardless of whether a
trademark owner intends to continue its own business, either personally or through assignment, after it exits the bankruptcy system.
This risk of license rejection creates uncertainty in trademark licensing arrangements and consequently threatens development of
economically efficient business practices.
Under Section 365 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Section 365"), 11 a bankruptcy debtor' 2 can reject executory contracts, 3
9. A manufacturer, by placing a widely recognized trademark on his prod-

uct, creates instant demand for his product because of the good will already
existing in the mark. Battersby & Grimes, supra note 2, at 272.
10. See Putney, supra note 5, at 155. The licensee usually makes substantial
investments in the license, as well as other tangibles and intangibles that are
necessary to the formation of a business. Jeffrey R. Seul, Comment, License
and FranchiseAgreements as Ezecutory Contracts: A ProposedAmendment to

Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 U. CoLO.L. REv. 129, 133 (1988).

11. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988). Section 365(a) reads in pertinent part as follows: "Except as provided in Sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d)of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id.
The debtor can assume an executory contract provided that he cures any
defaults or provides adequate assurance that he will promptly cure such defaults. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(B) (1988). The debtor can thereafter assign the
contract provided that the assignee gives adequate assurance of future performance. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(B) (1988). Furthermore, a party may request that
the bankruptcy court order the debtor to decide whether to assume or reject the
contract within a specified period. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1988). If a debtor-licensor decides to assume the license agreement and assign the trademark, he
must do so in accordance with trademark law;, specifically, he can only assign
the trademark with its associated good will. See Richard Lieb, The Interface of
Trademark and Bankruptcy Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 307, 315-20 (1988). This
comment is concerned with debtor-licensor rejection of executory license agreements and does not address debtor-licensee rejection or debtor-licensor and
debtor-licensee assumption of executory contracts. The IPBPA only remedied
debtor-licensor rejection of executory intellectual property license agreements.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (1988); S.REP. No. 505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988).
For a discussion of licensee bankruptcy and rejection of software license agreements, see generally J. Dianne Brinson, Software DistributionAgreements and
Bankruptcy: The Licensor'sPerspective, 64 WASH. L. REv. 499 (1989). See also
Victoria L. Gres, Comment, Rejection of Computer Software Licensing Agreements in Bankruptcy, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 361 (1986).
12. The Bankruptcy Code refers to the "trustee." However, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1107 (1988) and Bankruptcy Rule 9001(10) provide that the word "trustee"
includes a debtor in possession. Therefore, a debtor in possession is vested with
essentially the identical authority granted to a bankruptcy trustee, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1106 (1988), including the authority to operate the debtor's business. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1108 (1988). Thus, the rights and remedies of a debtor discussed in this comment apply equally to a trustee under chapter 11 or chapter 7. See Richard
Lieb, The Interrelationshipof Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law, 64 AM.
BANKIR.L.J. 1, 6 n.24 (1990) ("trustee" includes debtor in possession); Robert L.
Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Licensee's Mine
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subject to court approval. 14 A debtor that has granted another the
right to use its trademark ("debtor-licensor") can consequently reject the executory license agreement.' 5 This rejection unilaterally
Fiel",62 AM. BANKR. LJ.295,297 n.14 (1988) (debtor in possession has identical
authority as trustee).
13. The Bankruptcy Code does not define "executory contract." However,
the bankruptcy courts generally rely upon the following defition: "[A] contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to
the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the
other." Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973). See Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib., 872
F.2d 36, 39 (3rd Cir. 1989) (relying on Countryman's definition); Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756
F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985) (relying on Countryman's definition), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Wilson v. TXO Production Corp. (In re Wilson), 69
B.R. 960, 962 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (relying on Countryman's definition);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rose (In re Rose), 21 B.R. 272, 275 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1982) (citing Countryman's definition).
The legislative history of Section 365 states, "Though there is no precise
definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on
which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977); S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58
(1978). See Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib., 872 F.2d 36, 39 n.4
(3rd Cir. 1989) (citing Congress' definition); Bregman v. Meehan (In re
Meehan), 59 B.R. 380, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Congress' definition); In re
Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R. 561, 563 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983) (relying on Congress' definition). See also Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper,
Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990)
(contract is executory if performance is due to some extent on both sides); In re
Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427,429-30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (contract is executory
if performance is due to some extent on both sides).
The Countryman test is somewhat result oriented in that it is predicated on
the policy of benefit to the estate. In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 57-58 n.6 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982). One court stated that definitions, such as the Countryman test,
are helpful, but do not resolve this problem. The key, it seems, to deciphering the meaning of the executory contract rejection provisions, is to
work backward, proceeding from an examination of the purposes rejection
is expected to accomplish. If those objectives have already been accomplished, or if they can't be accomplished through rejection, then the contract is not executory within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir.),
cer. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978). See generally Michael T. Andrew, Current
Developments in Executory Contract Law, 489 PRAC. L. INST. 529 (1989).
14. See infra note 25 for a discussion of how a debtor can easily obtain court
approval for its decision to reject an executory trademark licensing contract.
15. See Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone
Potato Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990). In Blackstone, the debtor
licensed its trademark for potato chips, BLACKSTONE, to the licensee for use
on the licensee's popcorn. Id. at 559. The licensee rented space from the licensor and assumed truck rental payments. Id. The licensee further purchased
certain inventory of the licensor. Id. The licensor produced popcorn for the
licensee and allowed the licensee to use the trademark for four years. Id. The
court held that the license was executory and authorized the licensor to reject
the contract. Id. at 561. Thus, the valuable trademark right under the license
agreement was unilaterally extinguished after the licensee spent considerable
time negotiating and after the licensee established a four year expectation. The
value of the trademark was considerable, and thus the debtor-licensor deter-
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extinguishes the right of the licensee to use the licensed trademark.16 Until 1988, any debtor-licensor of intellectual property
could reject its license agreements. 17 With the passing of the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988 ("IPBPA"), 8s
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to protect specifically defined' 9 intellectual property licensees. Unfortunately, however,
Congress deliberately declined to address rejection of executory
trademark, trade name 2° or service mark 2 ' licenses, believing the
mined that it could bring assets into its estate by rejecting the license agreement. Id. at 559.
Trademark license agreements are always executory because there is an on
going relationship between the parties, with the licensor continuously controlling the quality of the goods or services the licensee sells. See Seul, supra note
10, at 132.
16. The licensee, in effect, cannot display the trademark on its goods anymore if the licensor rejects the license. It must remove the trademarks from
the labels and tags of the goods which it possesses. The licensce cannot distribute equipment on which the trademark is attached. In some situations, the
licensee's entire business is built around the license agreement. For instance, a
tie manufacturer who is licensed to display a certain trademark on his ties to

distribute to resale outlets may be manufacturing only ties with that particular

trademark. In this situation, the business may now have to find another source
of business. Because the licensee was trading off of the good will that was pre-

sumably already built up in the trademark, the loss of the use of the trademark

is a loss of a considerable investment.
17. See Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejection of technology license), cer denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejection of trademark license).

18. Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101(52)-(53), 365(n) (1988)).
19. As amended, the new § 101(52) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "Intellectual property" for purposes of § 365 as:
(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35;
(C) patent application;
(D) plant variety;,
(E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or
(F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17.
11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (1988). The definition is broad and Congress intended courts
to interpret it liberally to carry out its intent to remove the cloud Lubrizol cast
upon the intellectual property licensing system. S. REP., supra, note 11, at 7.
The Act does not define or alter any substantive intellectual property law, it
merely refers to those rights which are already protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law. Id. However, note the absence of trademarks, trade names or service marks from the definition.
20. "Trade names" are "the names of titles lawfully adopted and used by
persons, firms, associations, corporations, companies, unions, and any manufacturing, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or other organizations engaged in
trade or commerce and capable of suing and being sued in a court of law." 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). Trade names identify businesses, vocations, or occupations. Id.
21. "Service marks" are marks "used in the sale or advertising of services to
identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service,
from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if the
source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
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matter to be in need of more extensive study.22
This comment discusses Congress' exclusion of trademarks2
from the protection which the IPBPA affords other forms of intellectual property. Part I of this comment discusses the background
of the executory contract rejection problem and the passing of the
IPBPA in this context. Next, Part HIexamines the economic costs
of executory trademark license rejection and the risks that a trademark licensee faces under the present bankruptcy law. Part IH discusses Congress' reasons for excluding trademarks from the
IPBPA, and advocates that Congress must afford trademark
licenses similar protection.m Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to Section 365 which would protect trademark licensees from
deprivation of their license rights. This comment's proposal allows
for a licensee's continuation of its license rights even if a debtorlicensor rejects its license agreement, as long as the debtor-licensor
or an assignee intends to continue the business and the business'

associated good will.
I.

BACKGROUND TO EXECUTORY CONTRACT

AND THE

REJECTION

IPBPA

Under Section 365, a debtor may reject an executory contract
that the debtor, pursuant to its business judgment, deems burdensome.2
A rejection acts as a breach26 which replaces the
nondebtor's contract rights with a pre-petition general unsecured
claim for the resulting damages under Section 502(g) of the Bank22. S. REP., supra note 11, at 5. Interestingly, the United States Trademark

Association objected to including trademarks in the IPBPA. G. Gervaise Davis
III, Issues and Concerns in Software Licenses and Support Agreements, 272
PRAC. L. INsT. 465, 473 (1989).
23. This comment will use the term "trademark" to include both "trademarks" and "service marks."
24. Trademarks are a different form of intellectual property than patents
and copyrights. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:1, at 73. Their unique characteristics, however, should not prevent a similar treatment under the Bankruptcy Code. But in a similar vein, merely because trademarks are tagged
"intellectual property" does not mean that the law should treat trademarks the
same as other intellectual property in all circumstances. Therefore, this comment will not rely upon a simple analogy between trademarks and patents and
propose that all intellectual property be treated alike. See FRANCIs H. UPTON,
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TRADEMARKS 14 (1860) ("The right of property in
trademarks does not partake in any degree of the nature and character of a
patent or copyright, to which it has sometimes been referred-nor is it safe to
reason from any supposed analogies existing between them").
25. See Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), (rejection of technology
license pursuant to business judgment) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); In re
Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejection of trademark license pursuant to business judgment). A debtor cannot reject parts of a contract and assume others. Brinson, supra note 12, at 513. Property which is
burdensome would diminish rather than benefit an estate available for distribu-
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ruptcy Code.2 7 Rejection allows a debtor to disassociate itself from
burdensome entanglements, and relieves the debtor's property
from any further contractual restrictions. 2 8 In addition, rejection
furthers the underlying policy of reorganization under chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, which is to avoid liquidation of assets, and to
thus preserve the jobs and economic resources which the debtor's
business creates. 29 Nevertheless, rejection creates an unjust forfeiture of property rights when a nondebtor has obtained a property
interest in connection with a debtor's executory contract. Many
commentators have criticized the inequity which Section 365 creates,3° and Congress has subjected the section to a number of
tion to the debtor's creditors. See Lee Silverstein, Reection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization,31 U. Cm. L. REV. 467, 472 (1964).
The standard which bankruptcy courts generally follow to determine
whether to approve rejection of an executory contract is the "business judgment" test which requires a factual finding that the contract is burdensome.
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045;
Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip
Co.), 109 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D.RI. 1990). The bankruptcy courts defer to the
debtors' judgment and will not substitute their judgment for the debtor's.
Lurizol, 756 F.2d at 1047 (courts should defer to, and should not interfere with,
decisions of corporate directions upon matters entrusted to their business judgment).
Debtor-licensors have effectively used Section 365 in recent years to reject
license agreements they consider burdensome. See Blackstone Potato Chip Co.
v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557,560 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1990). A bankruptcy court will not, however, authorize rejection if the
debtor does not act both in good faith and with a valid reorganization purpose.
In re Southern California Sound Sys., Inc., 69 B.R 893, 899 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1987). In other words, the sole objective of filing for bankruptcy relief cannot
be to reject a hastily-formed contract. Id. at 898.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1988).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1988). A bankruptcy court may discount the amount
of any claim for damages to its present value as of the date of commencement of
the debtor's chapter 11 case. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., 79 B.R. 161, 165-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
28. Tamietti, supra note 12, at 299. In Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986), the debtor sought to reject the contract
in order to facilitate a sale or license of its technology uninhibited by the restrictive provisions in the license with the licensee. Id. at 1045.
29. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045.
30. See Michael A. Bloom & Bryna L. Singer, The Revised Section 365: Lessor's Panacea?,63 AM. BANKIR L.J. 199 (1989); Hon. Howard C. Buschmann HI,
Benefits and Burdens: Post-PetitionPerformance of Unassumed Executory
Contracts,5 BANKE. DEv. J. 341 (1988); Ronald W. Truman, Comment, Assumption of Unezpired Leases Under Section 365(d)(4), 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1121;
Diane Banks, Comment, Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code- Out of Balance
After 1984? 1986 UTAH L. REV. 781. See also Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N.
Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: What is an Executory Contract? A
Challengeto the Countryman Test; 15 U.C.C. L.J. 273 (1983) (discusses the criticisms of the Countryman test for determining whether a contract is executory).
Congress emphasized that it viewed a comprehensive re-working of Section 365
as the best way in the long run of dealing with areas requiring special exceptions to Section 365. H.R. REP. No. 1012,100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988). "Section
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exceptions.

31

Prior to its amendment in 1988, Section 365 created an inequitable situation when an intellectual property licensee faced a debtorlicensor's rejection of its license agreement. 32 The problem first became apparent in Lubrizol Enterprises,Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc..3s In Lubrizol, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that a technology4 licensor could unilaterally reject its license agreement under Section 365, consequently
discharging the right of the licensee to use the intellectual property.as Because many businesses rely on intellectual property
rights as a vital resource for survival,3 many businesses were faced
365 should be revised as a whole and fashioned so as to apply consistency in all
situations." Id.
31. The Bankruptcy Code currently provides protection from debtor rejection for real estate leases, 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1988), timeshare interests, id.,
contracts for the sale of real property, 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) (1988), collective
bargaining agreements, 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988), and health, life, and disability
benefits promised to retired workers, 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988), as well as intellectual property, 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (1988).
32. See generally Tamietti, supra note 12. Senator DeConcini criticized the
"technical dissection of intellectual property licensing agreements" which led to
situations "where a completed transaction involving intellectual property is really nothing more than a promise that can be broken." S1626, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S11,653 (1987).
33. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
34. The technology involved in the Lubrizol license was a metal coating
process. Id. at 1045. The licensor, Richmond Metal Finishers, owed three duties
to the licensee, Lubrizol, under the agreement. The first duty was to notify
Lubrizol of any patent infringement suit and to defend in such suit. Id. Second,
the licensor had a duty to notify Lubrizol of any other use or licensing of the
process, and to reduce royalty payments if a lower royalty rate agreement was
reached with another licensee. Id. Third, the licensor had a duty to indemnify
Lubrizol for losses arising out of any misrepresentation or breach of warranty
by the licensor. Id. Lubrizol's reciprocal duties included accounting for and
paying royalties for its use of the process and of canceling certain existing indebtedness. Id.
35. 756 F.2d at 1048. The Lubrizol court held that the license was executory
and subject to rejection. Id. at 1046. The court went on to say that, even though
Lubrizol could treat rejection as a breach, it could not seek to retain its rights
under the contract and thus could not rely on the agreement for continued use
of the technology. Id. at 1048. The court noted that it would not entertain equitable considerations with respect to this type of contract, reasoning that Congress plainly provided for the rejection of executory contracts notwithstanding
the obvious adverse consequences on the contracting parties. Id. Mentioning
that Congress has afforded special treatment for some types of executory contracts in the Bankruptcy Code, the Lubrizol court went on to say that the Code
does not contain any comparable treatment of technology licensees. Id. "They
share the general hazards created by section 365 for all business entities dealing
with potential bankrupts." Id.
36. Licenses are an economic advantage for businesses and manufacturers.
Companies which otherwise could not bring new products into the marketplace
rapidly because of the expenditure of time and money on risky research and
development projects can instead rely on license agreements. See Tamietti,
supra note 12, at 296. Licenses are generally based on relatively small initial
payments relative to the costs of acquiring the patented product or process it-
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with financial ruin due to the precedent which the Lubrizol case
established. 37
The IPBPA3 was Congress' solution to the unjust results that
the Lubrizol case presented. Congress was concerned about the
self. Id. This allows the manufacturer to avoid high initial acquisition costs as
long as it regularly pays royalty payments to the licensor throughout the term
of the licensee agreement. Id.
37. See Infosystems Technology, Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., Bankr. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1,899 (D. Mass. 1987), rev g sub nom In re Logical Software, Inc., 66
B.R. 683 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (remanded to determine whether rejection will
benefit the general unsecured creditors thus requiring the balancing test). Senator DeConcini, when he introduced the IPBPA, stated that Congress was concerned that successful businesses would fold because they wculd no longer have
access to the intellectual property that they built their foundation on in the first
place. S1626, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S11,653 (1987).
38. Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101(52)-(53), 365(n)). The IPBPA amended 11 U.S.C. § 365 to read in pertinent part as follows:
(n)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the
debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under
such contract may elect
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such
rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the
licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms,
applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee
with another entity;, or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under
such contract and under any agreement supplementary to such contract,
to such intellectual property (including any embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law),
as such rights existed immediately before the case commenced, for
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the
licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph
(1)(B) of this subsection, under such contract
(A) the trustee shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights;
(B) the licensee shall make all royalty payments due under such
contract for the duration of such contract and for any period described in
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection for which the licensee extends such
contract; and
(C) the licensee shall be deemed to waive
(i) any right of setoff it may have with respect to such contract
under this title or applicable nonbankruptcy law; and
(ii) any claim allowable under section 503(b) of this title arising
from the performance of such contract.
(3) If the licensee elects to retain its rights ... then on the written
request of the licensee the trustee shall
(A) to the extent provided in such contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, provide to the licensee any intellectual
property (including such embodiment) held by the trustee; and
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such
contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including such embodiment) from another entity.
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damaging effect that it anticipated the Lubrizol decision would have
on technological development. 3 9 Not only did Section 365 relieve
the debtor of its ongoing affirmative performance obligations4°
under the executory license agreement, but it also relieved the
debtor of its passive obligation to permit the licensee to use the intellectual property. 41 Under this view, rejection of the license resulted in valuable rights reverting to the bankruptcy estate.42 Once
these rights revert to the bankruptcy estate, a licensee can no
longer benefit from use of the intellectual property. The United
States Senate stated that the instability that Section 365 created for
intellectual property licensing relations would force parties, who
43
would have formerly accepted licenses, to demand assignments.
This demand for outright transfers of ownership of the intellectual
property is wasteful and chilling to business innovators who would
otherwise benefit from keeping their ownership rights.4 4
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1), (2), and (3) (1988).
Although the licensee waives any right to setoff and an administrative
claim, it does not waive the general damages claim allowed under Section
365(g). S. REP., supra note 11, at 10. See Andrew, supra note 13, at 557. For a
discussion of the status of a general damages claim, see infra text accompanying
notes 71-73.
39. S. REP., supra note 11, at 1. Licensing of technology plays a substantial
role in the process of technological development. Id. at 3. The Senate noted
that the process of innovation "begins with an inventive concept and must proceed through an expensive and risky series of steps including research, development, manufacturing and marketing. At each step, both money and additional
refinement are only available through the participation of persons other than
the original innovator." Id.
40. Such on going affirmative performance obligations would include the
duties to update the technology, to maintain the technology, and to inform the
licensee of changes or improvements in the technology. See Seul, supranote 10,
at 146.
41. S. REP., supra note 11, at 2.
42. Id. at 2-3.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. The Senate noted that, when technology licenses are assigned as
opposed to licensed, the creator is then "either totally alienated from his creation or, at best, given a license by the assignee. Such circumstances create obvious disincentives to the full development of intellectual property." S. REP.,
supranote 11, at 4. Licensing allows the original innovator to retain ownership
of his invention so that he shares in the ultimate economic reward, while also
sharing that reward as reimbursement to those who have provided the financing and refinement necessary to achieve economic success. Id. at 3. Licensing is
a mechanism whereby the innovator can seek others to help market in identified areas in which the invention may have uses without risking the probability
that one developer's narrow focus will deny him the rewards of development in
another area. Id. In introducing the bill, Senator DeConcini stated that the
system of licensing as opposed to assignment, evolved to assure "a full and fair
development opportunity for patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks.
Through the use of nonexclusive licenses, different commercial applications of
intellectual property develop in different geographic markets." S1626, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S11,653 (1987).
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Thus, to countermand these negative results, Congress passed
the IPBPA. The IPBPA provides that, in the event a bankruptcy
debtor rejects an intellectual property license, the licensee has two
options: either (1) treating the license as terminated; or (2) retaining the rights granted prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition,
45
with the exception of the right to compel specific performance.
This provision allows a business relying on a license agreement to
continue its use of the intellectual property46 while still relieving
the debtor of its obligations under the license agreement. The
47
IPBPA, however, failed to cover trademark licensing agreements.
45. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365 (n)(1)(A) and (B) (1988). See Andrew, supranote 13, at
554-55; Daniel T. Brooks, Intellectual Property Bankruptcy ProtectionAct of
1988, 272 PRAC. L. INsT. 575, 634-35 (1989); Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Senate 1626:
Battling the Windmills of Bankruptcy, 255 PRAC. L. INsT. 715, 720-21 (1988);

Lieb, supra note 11, at 314 n.35; Lieb, supranote 12, at 37; Putney, supranote 5,

at 156; Cary H. Sherman & Jonathan S. Berck, A Practitioner'sView of Source
Code Escrows, 259 PRAC. L. INST. 173,198 (1988); Seul, supra note 10, at 144 n.81.
"Retention of contractual rights, both in extent and quality, is a central aim of
the [IPBPA]." S. REP., supra note 11, at 9.
46. Putney, supra note 5, at 156. However, the licensor's duties to service
the licensed technology, to provide updates and improvements for the licensed
technology, to provide the licensee with continued training in the use of the
technology, or to indemnify or defend the licensee from infringement claims
are no longer operational. See H.R. REP., supra note 30, at 7. Debtor-licensors
are still "able to free themselves of burdensome obligations by rejecting license
agreements" under the IPBPA, only the licensees now "have the assurance of
being able to continue to use the licensed intellectual property after rejection."
Id. at 5. The licensee must still prepare for the loss of these contractual rights.
Tamietti, supra note 12, at 310. However, a licensee that retains its rights under
the rejected license agreement "remains bound by the other obligations or duties required under the contract except for those so directly related to obligations or duties that the licensor has been freed from by rejection as to make it
inequitable to bind the licensee to them." H.R. REP., supra note 30, at 7.
47. The original draft of the IPBPA contained a proposal for protecting
trademarks but it was subsequently dropped. This proposal provided, in pertinent part,
(n)(2) . .. The trustee may not interfere with the grantee's rights
(C) in the case of a trademark, trade name, service mark, or similar intellectual property, to permit existing grantees to continue in concert the
quality assurance procedures of the licensor.
S1626, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S11,653 (1987). See Hemnes, supra
note 45, at 722. Hemnes notes that this proposal "invited disapprobation from
the trademark bar" because it presumes that the licensee enjoys a "right" to
"permit" other licensees to continue the quality control provisions. Id. Hemnes
labels this presumption as "nonsensical." Id. However, the problem with the
original draft was in its drafting, not in its effect. Licensees surely do not have a
"right" to allow other licensees to continue the quality control, however, licensees would still have a duty to maintain the quality and would still have the
right to enjoy the use of a trademark without a licensor's interference.
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II. REJE'nON OF EXECUTORY TRADEMARK LICENSES:
THE PROBLEM

The economic costs that rejection of a trademark license agreement poses becomes apparent when one weighs the value and purpose of trademarks against the effects of the loss of the licensee's
rights. Trademarks and trademark licenses serve a valuable economic function. Rejection, on the other hand, creates no measurable benefit and only hinders economic development. Coupled with
these costs, the ease with which rejection is possible creates a considerable risk to a licensee wishing to effectively compete in its industry through its use of licensing agreements.
Federal trademark law satisfies two basic purposes.4 It protects the public, 49 and it protects a trademark as a valuable property
right.50 First, trademark law protects the public by fostering bene48. Both common law and statutory trademark rights and remedies are directed toward a dual purpose. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
412-13 (1916). Though the trademark provides a means for an entrepreneur to
capitalize on any good will his business has created, protection of the public
seems to be the more dominant theme in the trademark cases. Comment, supra
note 7, at 878-79 n.7.
The intent of the Lanham Act, as stated in § 45, is as follows:
The intent of this Act is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in
such commerce... to protect persons engaged in such commerce against
unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by
the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). The most important of the Lanham Act's benefits are
constructive notice, incontestability, and the right to a federal cause of action.
PATrISHALL & HLLkABD, supra note 1, § 3.02, at 88 (1987). Registration under
the Lanham Act also provides prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce on the goods or services specified in the
registration certificate. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1988). The Lanham Act provides
civil remedies for infringement. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-20 (1988).
49. See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark,99 YALE L.J. 759,
579 (1990). Carter states that the legal protection of trademarks provides incentives for firms to make investments aimed at gaining consumer confidence in
their marks. Id. "Successful marks are like packets of information. They
lower consumer search costs, thus promoting the efficient functioning of the
market." Id. See also Putney, supra note 5, at 157 ("Trademarks buttress our
free enterprise system and stimulate our economy").
50. Lieb, supra note 12, at 5; Patterson Lab. Inc. v. Roman Cleanser Co. (In
re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), gff'd, 802 F.2d
207 (6th Cir. 1986). "In the sense of an 'exclusive right' trademarks can be categorized as a form of 'property': The right to use a trademark is recognized as a
kind of property, of which the owner is entitled to the exclusive enjoyment to
the extent that it has been actually used." 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:6, at
20. But see PAT'rsHALL & HILIJARD, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 5 ("The 'property'
concept, nevertheless, is logically incompatible and irreconcilable with the historic deception as to source rationale for trade identity, trademark and unfair
competition law."). While trademarks can be considered "property," this characterization often "creates more confusion than clarity." 1 McCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 2:6, at 20.
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ficial economic practices. Trademarks themselves promote technological advancement through competition and improve the quality
of life.51 Trademarks foster economic freedom by encouraging en52
trepreneurial investment and by preventing public deception.
Second, federal trademark law protects the trademark's drawing
power,53 which is valuable to any business. 54 This value, independent of the trademark's role in source differentiation and identification, makes it a form of property many businesses desire to use.
A trademark license permits another to market goods using the
licensor's trademark.55 The grant of a license is in the nature of a
conveyance of a property right.5 The essential element in any
51. Putney, supra note 5, at 157. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality).
52. Putney, supra note 5, at 144. Putney states:
The legal protection given to trademarks secures to the owners thereof
the good will created by the sale of products of high quality. The investment in quality symbolized by a trademark is protected against infringement. Competition in quality is fostered, and the public is protected from
deceit and assured that it is purchasing the product represented by a known
trademark.
Id. A business whose goods are known on the market and distinguished from
others has good will which courts protect against another's use or imitation in
any way likely to deceive the public as to the origin of the product. See PArSHALL & HL.IARD, supra note 1, § 1.02.

53. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.

203 (1942). In Mishawaka Rubber, Justice Frankfurter stated,
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less
true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he
has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human
propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the
market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the
means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the
minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which
it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner has something of
value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol
he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Id. at 205. A trademark's drawing power is evident in that consumers almost
entirely make purchasing decisions based upon trademarks. Comment, supra
note 7, at 875.
54. The value of a trademark is proportional to the good will that it signifies. Carter, supra note 49, at 761 n.5. Carter's article describes how the full
cost of goods to a consumer is the price of the goods plus the consumer's cost of
searching for the goods. Id. at 763. The value to the company comes from the
increased good will behind the trademark and the larger number of consumers
who attach a positive association to the trademark. Id. The company will consequently make more sales at a higher price. Id. After a company has invested
in features that make a trademarked product appealing to the public, any business which uses the mark through a license has instant good will and an instant
market. Cf. Battersby & Grimes, supra note 2, at 273 (licensee can immediately
distinguish his product from his competitor's).
55. Putney, supra note 5, at 140.
56. Lieb, supra note 12, at 36.
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trademark license is the continuing obligation of the licensor to permit the licensee's use of the trademark 5 7 in connection with the sale
of the licensee's goods.5 8 In exchange, the licensee has a continuing
obligation to pay royalties to the licensor and to maintain the quality of the product which bears the trademark. 59 Licensing agreements save the licensee from the initial costs of establishing a
business and acquiring its own trademark. Businesses have recently developed additional forms of trademark licensing, such as
merchandising,6° collateral product licensing,6 1 and character li62
censing, which are different from standard licensing agreements.
These growing forms allow the use of a mark on goods that are different from those goods which the owner first produced with the
mark.6 3 The business community's increased activity in these
forms of licensing exemplifies the importance of trademark
licensing.
A licensee's loss of its trademark rights has broad economic
costs. The trademark is, at least temporarily, removed from the
market. This removal potentially diminishes the debtor-licensor's
good will because the public is no longer exposed to the debtor-licensor's trademark. Thus, the public is unable to identify that
owner as the source of any desirable product. Furthermore, removal of the trademark from the market increases consumer
5
search costs.64 Because trademarks are "packets of information,"
57. Trademarks are more commonly used by placing the mark on product

packages, signs, tags, and through advertising. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 17:14 C. The licensce need not display the licensor's trade name on the tags
and packages, only the licensed mark and the name of the licensee need appear.
Coolley, supra note 1, at 317; 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:14 C.
58. Putney, supra note 5, at 140.
59. Id.

60. Historically, "merchandising" was sales promotion which comprehen-

sively consisted of market research, development of new products, coordination
of manufacture and marketing, and effective advertising and selling. Battersby
& Grimes, supra note 2, at 271. Today, a large part of the merchandising format
is the use of words, names, titles, symbols, designs, character or personality
images or likenesses, or combinations thereof which have acquired a wide degree of public recognition through mass media exposure. Id. at 272. Different
identifiable forms of merchandising may include character licensing, national
brands, designer names, athletic teams and their star players, rock stars, colleges, and universities. Id. This use is primarily on goods and for the sole purpose of arousing consumers who identify with the various symbols and
compelling them to buy those goods because they do identify with the marks.
ICE

61. See supra note 2.
62. Marks, supra note 1, at 646.
63. Id.
64. For a thorough economic analysis of the value of trademarks in relation
to consumer search costs, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987). See
also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:1, at 47-49 (economic analysis of
trademarks).
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removal of the trademark from the market environment decreases
the net economy of information available to the public. 66 Consequently, the economy suffers from the increased costs to consumers
who must find products comparable to those with which they are
familiar by resorting to alternate channels of information.
Moreover, trademark license rejection creates no measurable
benefits, and the costs of rejection are unduly one-sided. Because a
trademark owned by a title 11 debtor is an executory contract
within the meaning of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 67 the
owner of the mark is entitled to exercise the right of rejection. 8
Thus, the debtor-licensor may terminate the right of the licensee to
use the trademark or to enjoy any other rights6 9 the licensor
granted in the agreement. Section 502(g) 70 of the Bankruptcy Code
replaces these contract rights with an unsecured claim for the resulting damages. 71 However, because the Bankruptcy Code treats
the nondebtor as a mere unsecured creditor,72 the licensee will
likely receive only a small proportion of its total damage claim from
the estate's distribution to its unsecured creditors. 73 As a result, the
licensee not only loses its rights when the trademark reverts back
to the bankruptcy estate, but it receives little or no compensation.74
65. Carter, supra note 49, at 759.
66. See Carter, supra note 49, at 762-63. With the removal of the trade-

mark, even if only temporarily, consumers are forced to find products of similar

quality to that of the original business which has presumably already built up
its good will. This creates increased product search costs because consumers
must now purchase and test other products to determine whether those products are compatible with those which the consumers have been purchasing. Because trademarks serve an informational purpose, removal of the trademark
lowers the net economy of information available to consumers from which consumers make their purchasing decisions. See id.
67. Blackstone Potato Chip Co v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato
Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557, 561 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990).
68. Id.
69. The other rights typically accompanying a trademark license may include the right to have the licensor inform the licensee of new creative developments, the right to have the licensor refrain from entering into other
agreements or marketing the subject of the agreement on its own, and the right
to have the licensor defend or prosecute infringement suits. See Seul, supra
note 10, at 133.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1988).
71. Seul, supra note 10, at 146-47.
72. A general unsecured creditor includes an "entity that has a claim
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor," and an entity that has a claim against the estate under
Section 502(g), such as a licensee whose license the licensor rejected. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(9) (1988).
73. Seul, supra note 10, at 146-47.
74. Prohibiting the use of a licensor's trademark would disrupt the licensee's business. To remain in business, the licensee must change all of its signs,
product lines, and advertising to eliminate the trademarks thus incurring substantial expense. Cf Culligan Intn'l Co. v. Culligan Water Conditioning, Inc.,
563 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (D. Minn. 1983) (substantial disruption of business re-
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Furthermore, the ease with which a licensor can reject its license agreements under Section 365 creates a substantial risk of license divestature to a licensee. The bankruptcy courts follow a
"business judgment" test when authorizing a debtor-licensor's rejection of its license agreement, which a debtor-licensor can easily
satisfy by demonstrating that the license is burdensome.75 Bankruptcy courts defer to the business judgment of a debtor.76 Currently, the law does not afford trademark licensees protection from
a debtor-licensor's mere exercise of its business judgment to breach
its contract. 77 Thus, the risk of a debtor-licensor's rejection creates
uncertainty for licensees because they can not expect any genuine
finality to license agreements. For example, a licensee's rights
under a license may not continue as long as it originally planned.
Consequently, its business plans are subject to unforeseeable and
uncontrollable time limitations. This uncertainty may decrease a
licensee's cost in procuring an agreement because the parties may
deduct a risk factor from the royalties payable to a licensor. However, the risk also significantly lowers the overall value of the license to a licensee.
Based on the preceding facts, it is apparent that rejection not
only hinders economic development, but also imposes unjustifiable
costs on individual businesses. The law should not create an atmosphere that favors forfeiture and diminishes progress. Small businesses and consumers should not bear the cost of uncertainty in
business affairs without compelling reasons.
III.

CONFRONTING THE REASONS FOR EXCLUSION

Congress refused to include trademarks in the Bankruptcy
Code's definition of "Intellectual Property,"7 8 thus excluding them
from the protection of the IPBPA, for three reasons. First, Congress was concerned that Section 365 would inhibit technological
sults when business is forced to change advertising to eliminate trademark); In

re Vylene Enters., 63 B.R&900, 911 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (preliminary injunction prohibiting use of trademarks would require change of signs and advertising). The licensee's whole marketing strategy would change and the licensee
would certainly have to find another trademark to do business under. Finding
another trademark can be time consuming and expensive, involving search
costs, equipment, and sign changes.
75. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business judgment test..
76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deference given to a debtor's business judgement.
77. See Lieb, supra note 12, at 4 ("At present there is no bankruptcy law
statute which deals specially with trademarks or one that even uses the word
'trademark.' Nor is there any reference to 'bankruptcy' in the statutory law
dealing with trademarks.").
78. See supra note 19 for the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "Intellectual
Property" for purposes of Section 365.
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development which is associated more with patents and other forms
of intellectual property. 79 Second, Congress noted that trademark
licensing relationships are unique in that they depend to a large extent on the licensor's control of the quality of the products or services that the licensee sells.8 ° Third, Congress determined that it
should postpone action in this area to allow the bankruptcy courts
the opportunity to develop an equitable treatment of the problem. 8 '
However, none of these reasons survive careful scrutiny.
First, Congress' concern with Section 365's effect on technologi-

cal development, coupled with Section 365's potentially damaging
effect on economic development, must also persuade Congress to
treat trademarks similarly. A licensee's loss of trademark license
rights has a hindering effect on both technological development and
economic development.8 2 Trademarks promote technological advancement.8 3 In fact, trademark licenses frequently accompany
technology licenses" and thereby generate incentives to invest in
79. See discussion in S. REP., supra note 11, at 2-5.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Congress was most concerned with Section 365's effect on technological
development. Id. However, competition is another value that the licensing
laws should encourage. The risks of bankruptcy and the atmosphere of fear
Section 365 creates should not dampen that value.
83. Putney, supra note 5, at 157.
84. Comment, supra note 7, at 885. See Adam v. Folger, 120 F. 260 (7th Cir.
1903). In Adam v. Folger,the Seventh Circuit held that a particular trademark
license was a natural consequence of the patent license. Id. at 264. The process
of technology licensing involves an inventive concept which proceeds through
an expensive series of steps including manufacturing and marketing. See S.
REP., supra note 11, at 3. The manufacture and marketing of patents or
software would thus involve a scheme by which the owner would "name" his
product with a trademark in order to quickly develop good will and public recognition.
In some situations, the use of a trademark is a material part of the value of
software licenses. Davis, supra note 22, at 473. Thus, the loss of the right to use
the trademark in conjunction with the software may create an alarming problem. Davis states,
For the present, no one seems to know how best to deal with this situation, except that it would seem important to provide [in the license agreement] that the licensee may continue to use the software, but be relieved of
any obligation to use the trademark. As many software licenses require
that the trademark be used, in order to protect the quality and preserve
some uniformity, some [contract] provision is needed.
Id. at 474.
An example of this situation is where an owner of a computer software
program, which is capable of proofreading grammar for a particular word
processor, licenses its software to a company which produces different types of
personal word processing units. The licensee uses the software for its word
processor and must affix the trademark on its packages and products. If the
licensor rejects the license agreement, the licensee must remove the trademarks from its word processors, packages, and marketing methods. The agreement may have provided that the licensee only use the software in conjunction
with the trademark, in order to preserve uniformity with other uses of the
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technology. The uncertainty in the licensing environment, however, makes businesses apprehensive about entering into a complex
marketing or manufacturing scheme for fear of having to later start
over again. Congress was, thus, incomplete in its protection of technology under the IPBPA. Therefore, the equally important economic function of trademarks, coupled with rejection's hindrance of
technological development, requires an equal level of concern for
trademarks.
Second, the unique nature of the licensor's duty of quality control8 5 is inconsequential to exempting trademarks from rejection
under Section 365. The duty of a licensor to control the quality of a
licensee's goods under a license agreement does, at first glance,
seem incompatible with the rejection provision of the Bankruptcy
Code.8s On the surface, a licensor's duty is incompatible with rejection because the duty is burdensome and potentially draining on the
bankruptcy estate's assets. Furthermore, any trimming of the
trustee's power of rejection makes administering the estate more
87
difficult and reduces the recovery of unsecured creditors.
However, Congress has created exceptions for similar situations. The quality control requirements in trademark licensing
agreements are similar to the requirements of other intellectual
property relationships. Patent license agreements, for instance, frequently require obligations on the part of the licensor. These duties
include the licensor's obligation to continually update and maintain
the technology included in the license agreement.8s These requirements inure to the benefit of consumers to some degree. 9 Because
software which the owner may license to others, and to indicate the source of
the quality of the particular program. In cases where the licensee sells to a
particularized market, the trademark may be an important component to sym-

bolize the high quality of the components of the particular goods.

85. Quality control is an important function in trademark licensing. See 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 18:14 - 18:18. The requirement of quality control is
construed in light of the need to prevent deception of the public. Embedded
Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
Thus, the Lanham Act places an affirmative duty on a licensor to take reasonable measures to detect and prevent his licensees' misleading uses of his trademark or potentially be subject to cancellation of his federal registration.
Accurate Merchandising, Inc. v. American Pacific, 186 U.S.P.Q. 197, 200

(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
86. Some view the trustee's power to reject executory contracts as central
to the administration of a debtor's estate. See Hemnes, supra note 45, at 719.
Hemnes argues that it is part of the trustee's responsibility "to get rid of 'property' that is burdensome to the debtor's estate." Id. Further, it is necessary that
all creditors of the same class be treated equally. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Seul, supra note 10, at 146.
89. Technology is protected by the patent laws because of its benefit to society through encouraging creative genius and through the supply of efficient advanced equipment. See Tamietti, supra note 12, at 296. Many licensee's cannot
continue using the intellectual property which another company has licensed to
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Congress protected patent licensees even in the absence of the licensors' affirmative performance obligations of maintaining tech-

nology, Congress has demonstrated that it is possible to afford
similar treatment for trademark licensees without burdening the
bankruptcy system.
Moreover, Congress' fears of undermining the quality control
function of trademark licenses with a comparable treatment under
the Bankruptcy Code are unfounded. In theory, the legal protection that federal law affords trademarks provides incentives for
businesses to make investments aimed at gaining consumer confidence in the marks. 90 This incentive is attractive to licensees as
well.9 ' Under an amendment similar to the IPBPA, a licensee
would still be under the obligations of the license agreement even
though the licensor has rejected it. 92 More importantly, however, a
licensee's sale of trademarked goods of a quality differing from the
licensor's set standards constitutes trademark infringement 93 and
them without the continued performance of the licensor. See Seul, supra note
10, at 146. Without this support, the equipment becomes useless and society
loses the benefit of its availability. Computer software, for the most part, is not
patentable. See Duncan M. Davidson, ProtectingComputer Software. A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 Ju~nmA
cs J. 337, 359 (1983). However, most license
agreements concerning computer software involve support agreements also.
See Viktoria L. Gres., Comment, Reection of Computer Software Licensing
Agreements in Bankruptcy, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 361, 368 (1986). Computers
have increasing application in accounting systems and monitoring and controlling production lines in manufacturing plants. Id. at 361. Reason would dictate
that such software programs may be useless without support maintenance from
the licensor and technological updates.
90. Carter, supra note 49, at 759.
91. But see Taggart, Trade-Marks and Related Companies: A New Concept
in Statutory Trade-Mark Law, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234,235 (1949) (licensees may have the opportunity to dilute the quality of the goods associated with
the trademark and thereby deceive the public). As one commentator pointed
out, however, a licensing arrangement permits varying quality levels within the
standard the public expects. Comment, supra note 7, at 879 n.20.
92. For example, the House Report accompanying the IPBPA stated that,
A licensee that retains its rights under a rejected contract remains bound
by the other obligations or duties required under the contract, except for
those so directly related to obligations or duties that the licensor has been
freed from by rejection as to make it inequitable to bind the licensee to
them.

H.R. REP., supra note 30, at 7. Similarly, the license would still bind a trademark licensee retaining its rights under a rejected contract if the amendment
does not depart from the provisions of the IPBPA. It would certainly not be
inequitable to bind the licensor to the quality control provisions in order to protect the public from deception.
93. See Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 F.
Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (defendant's sale of goods in breach of quality standards held to be trademark infringement of licensed trademark). Cf.
Franchised Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968) (sale of
non-authorized goods by franchisee held to be trademark infringement).
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unfair competition."

As a result, there are already incentives for

licensees to maintain the licensor's quality control provisions lest a
court find the licensee liable for infringement.9 5 The licensee is
also, in effect, warranting to the public that its goods are of the
same level of quality that the trademark signifies.96 Thus, the
mechanism of market forces and the anti-fraud laws make it highly
94. See Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 F.
Supp. 715, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (sale of sweaters at a quality standard below that
of licensor constituted unfair competition).
95. A trademark infringement occurs when another person uses in commerce a reproduction of another's trademark or uses a mark in commerce
which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S.C.
1114(1) (1988). A basis for confusion includes similarity of appearance, sound,
or connotation. PATISHALL & HLLIARD, supra note 1, § 5.02.
In order to recover for trademark infringement, the plaintiff must first
have a protected trademark. Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp.,
768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986). A trademark is created by prior use in commerce. Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508
F.2d 1260,1264-65 (1975). There are four classifications of potential trademarks:
(1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) distinctive. See generally 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11:1 - 11:24. Distinctive marks can be further characterized as coined, fanciful, or arbitrary. See PATrISHALL & HILIARD, supra
note 1, § 2.04, at 50. For a descriptive mark to obtain protection, it must first
acquire secondary meaning. Id. Secondary meaning means that a name has established a general reputation. Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F.
Supp. 777, 782-83 (M.D.N.C. 1962). A court looks at various factors to determine
whether a mark has established secondary meaning, including- "(1) the length
and manner of use of the mark in question; (2) the nature and extent of advertising and promotion of the mark; and (3) the efforts toward promoting a conscious connection in the public mind between that mark and a particular
product." Id. at 783. "The essence of secondary meaning is popularity and public acceptance of the mark." Id. Secondary meaning is established as long as a
substantial section of the purchasing public identifies the trade name of the producer's goods. Id. If the primary significance of the term in the minds of the
consuming public is not the product, but the producer, then an owner has established secondary meaning for a descriptive mark. Transgo, 768 F.2d at 1015.
Some courts hold that evidence of likelihood of confusion can establish secondary meaning. See Transgo,768 F.2d at 1015; Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1971).
96. A trademark implicitly represents that a particular standard of quality
is associated with the good will of the owner. Lieb, supra note 12, at 6. Thus, by
placing the trademark on its goods, the licensee is, in effect, certifying that it is
maintaining the same quality level as that associated with the owner. For instance, a study has found that a brand name on a product influences the perception of the quality of a product greater than the price. Margaret F. Goldstein,
Products Liability and the Trademark Owner. When a Trademark is a Warranty, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 587, 598 (1977). Unfortunately, this warranty theory also imposes liability upon the trademark owner if the product causes
injury. See Kosters v. Seven-up Co., 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979); Kenneth B.
Germain, Tort Liability of TrademarkLicensor in an Eraof "Accountability':"
A Tale of Three Cases, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 128 (1979); Goldstein, supra at 598.
If the licensee fails to maintain the quality, then the trademark owner may still
be held vicariously liable in some jurisdictions. See Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1978) (respondeat superior); City of
Harford v. Associated Constr. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1978) (strict products liability); Cornelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d
155 (Ill. 1979) (strict products liability), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980).
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unlikely that licensees will abandon the quality standards to which
they originally agreed. 97 As these many factors illustrate, a similar
treatment of trademarks under the Bankruptcy Code would not undermine quality control.
Third, Congress cannot shift the responsibility for developing
an equitable treatment of trademark license rejection problem to
the bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy courts' development of an
equitable treatment of license rejection under Section 365 has
proved to be somewhat futile. Most bankruptcy courts have been
reluctant to exercise broad equitable powers. 98 Furthermore, the
bankruptcy courts have exercised equitable powers only in those
situations which will result in the unjustified and total destruction
of a licensee's business. 99 This "balancing of the equities" test
which the courts apply, however, does not remedy the majority of
trademark situations and therefore will result in the loss of important property rights of many deserving licensees. 1° °
97. See Patterson Lab., Inc. v. Roman Cleanser Co. (In re Roman Cleanser
Co.), 802 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1986).
98. See Robertson v. Pierce (In re Chi-Feng Huang), 23 B.R. 798 (9th Cir.
1982); Bregman v. Meehan (In re Meehan), 59 B.R. 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re
Midwest Polychem, Ltd., 61 BJ. 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). But see In re
Smith Jones, Inc., 26 B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. D. Minm. 1982) ("1 am satisfied that
this being a court of equity, the court is obliged to measure the relative effects
of rejection"). At least one court and commentator have suggested, prior to
Lubrizol, that patent, copyright and trademark licenses are not rejectable because of a judicially created policy of protection and encouragement of creative
genius, regardless of their executory nature. In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 57 n.6
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (quoting Lee Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 467, 482 (1964)).
99. See In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R. 561, 564 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1983); Seul, supra note 10, at 143. Generally, the bankruptcy courts are
most likely to accept the hardship argument when rejection will not guarantee
the debtor's survival and where it will certainly guarantee the other party's
demise. Brooks, supra note 45, at 609. The courts balance the potential destruction of the licensee's business and the size of the resulting damage claim under
Section 365(g) with the benefit derived by the general creditors. In re Petur,35
B.R. at 563. If the resulting damage to the licensee would be grossly disproportionate to any benefit derived from rejection, then the courts refuse to authorize the rejection of the license. Id.
100. The Senate suggested that bankruptcy courts use their equitable powers
to prevent the unjustifiable destruction of licensee rights. S. REP., supra note
11, at 5. Specifically, Congress stated that it would postpone action to allow for
development of equitable treatment by the bankruptcy courts. Id. This suggests that bankruptcy courts may apply more liberal rules to trademark license
rejections, not just that Congress has approved the "balancing of equities" test.
But see Putney, supra note 5, at 156 ("In effect, Congress endorsed the balancing of equities approach"). The "balancing of equities" test which bankruptcy
courts have increasingly used does not provide the best remedy. However, it
does show an increased willingness on the part of the bankruptcy courts to react
compassionately to inequitable results of the rejection provision of Section 365.
See, e.g., Info Systems Technology, Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1899 (D. Mass 1987), rev V sub nom In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R.
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Congress' reasons for excluding trademarks from the IPBPA
are not compelling. Therefore, these reasons should no longer preclude affording a similar protection for trademarks with that which
currently exists for other forms of intellectual property. Handled
properly, an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code can protect a licensee's investment. As one commentator noted, "The policy of rehabilitation of the debtor should not spawn additional bankruptcies
and associated unemployment."' 0 1 A solution to the licensing problem is, thus, essential.
IV.

THE SOLUTION: AN AMENDMENT TO SECTION 365

Congress must amend the Bankruptcy Code to effectively resolve the problem of debtor-licensor rejection of executory trademark license agreements. A six point revision to the Bankruptcy
Code is necessary to achieve this goal. First, a trademark licensee
must have the option to retain its rights under the license agreement. Second, the amendment must provide for protection of the
public by requiring the bankruptcy courts to make two preliminary
determinations, one concerning trademark abandonment and the
other concerning quality control. These determinations make a licensee's choice to maintain its rights contingent on a court's approval. Third, the amendment must provide for the delivery of any
materials which were promised in the license agreement. Fourth,
the amendment must guarantee a licensee's quiet enjoyment of the
683 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (holding that the balancing of the equities approach
was the proper test to use).
Prior to congressional action, however, potential licensees are still at risk of
losing their investments. With the cooperation of the bankruptcy courts, the
atmosphere under Section 365 can be less apprehensive. Thus, in the interim
before Congressional action, bankruptcy courts must expand the use of their
equitable powers to prevent the destruction of businesses. The bankruptcy
courts are courts of equity, In re Petur,35 B.R. at 563; In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 58
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982), and should freely exercise equitable powers when confronted with a debtor-licensor's rejection of an executory trademark license
agreement. The Bankruptcy Code itself states that rejection is subject to court
approval. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988). Therefore, the bankruptcy courts will not
be overreaching by refusing or conditioning rejection.
101. Putney, supra note 5, at 155. The bankruptcy court in In re Peturtook
judicial notice that, since the effective date of the Code, only three and one half
percent of the hundreds of Chapter 11 cases filed in its district had resulted in
confirmed plans, and that most of the cases confirmed involved partial or total
liquidation as opposed to reorganization and the continuation of the business.
In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R 561, 564 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
The court went on to say that it would be anomalous to permit the rejection,
and if the licensee was thus forced out of business, for the debtor-licensor to "go
the way of the ninety-six and one-half percent" of the district's Chapter 11
cases. Id. Bankruptcy courts traditionally have been concerned more with rehabilitation of the debtor than with protection of trademarks and the consuming public. Putney, supra note 5, at 157-58. Because the success rate of
reorganization is approximately ten percent, this emphasis on rehabilitation is
misplaced. Id.
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right to use the trademark. Fifth, the licensee must continue payment of royalties to the licensor or its bankruptcy estate. Last, the
licensee must be able to continue its rights under the license for the
duration through which the licensor originally promised. This proposal attempts to maintain the Bankruptcy Code's established policy of encouraging both debtor rehabilitation and equality of
distribution among creditors. 0 2
First, the amendment to the Bankruptcy Code for protecting
trademark licensees must provide the same options as the current
Section 365(n) provides for other forms of intellectual property.
Under the amendment, if a debtor-licensor rejects the executory license agreement, a licensee would have an option to elect to preserve its rights under the agreement. L 3 This option protects the
legitimate business interests of licensees and allows for continued
consumer satisfaction through continued availability of trademarked goods. A licensee's option to retain its rights under its licensing agreement, however, must be contingent on the debtorlicensor's lack of an intent to abandon the trademark and on the
licensee's maintenance of the quality control procedures it originally agreed to in the license agreement.
To achieve the first point of this amendment, a second change
is required. The amendment must provide that a bankruptcy court
make two preliminary determinations before it authorizes the licensee to retain its rights under the agreement: one concerning
abandonment, 10 4 and one concerning quality control. Initially, the
bankruptcy court must determine that the debtor-licensor has not
or will not abandon the trademark. Bankruptcy is not an abandon102. See Lieb, supra note 11, at 315.
103. Accord Putney, supra5, at 159.
104. Abandonment of a trademark occurs when a trademark owner intends
not to continue use of the mark in commerce after it has discontinued its use.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). A court will presume an intent to abandon if the owner
does not use the mark for two years. Id. An owner can rebut this presumption

with evidence of an intent to resume use of the mark. Sterling Brewers, Inc. v.
Schenley Indus., 441 F.2d 675, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Because abandonment of a
trademark is a forfeiture of a property interest, the courts will require strict
proof of the abandonment. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037,
1044 (2d Cir. 1980). Bankruptcy is not an abandonment. See infra note 105.
A court will also deem a trademark abandoned if the owner causes the
mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
A trademark can lose its significance as to origin if the owner assigns the mark
without also assigning the good will associated with the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1060
(1988); Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods., 759 F.2d 1053,1059 (2d
Cir.), cert denied,474 U.S. 844 (1985). An assignment in connection with different good will would result in fraud on the purchasing public who reasonably
assumes that the mark signifies the same good will as had previously existed.
Defiance Button, 759 F.2d at 1059. However, the central purpose of the rules
regarding assignment of trademarks is to protect the consuming public. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:1 C. Hence, the rules were not evolved for the purpose of invalidating all assignments which do not satisfy a particular set of
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ment, perse.10 5 If, however, the debtor does not continue to use the
trademark and does not intend to resume use of the trademark,
then the mark will become an abandoned mark.1° 6 Before allowing
a licensee to continue using a trademark, the bankruptcy court
must find that the debtor-licensor does not intend to abandon 0 7 the
mark or that it intends to continue its use in commerce either personally or through assignment.10 8 Otherwise, if a licensee continformalities. Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp.
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971).
The owner can further cause a mark to lose its significance as to its source
if it enters into a "naked license," or in other words, enters into a licensing
agreement without taking measures to assure quality. Defiance Button, 759
F.2d at 1059. If the owner allows others to misuse his mark, including the licensee, he may find that he has lost the mark due to abandonment. Sheila's Shine
Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 125 (5th Cir. 1973). Again, because insufficient control remains a forfeiture, the party asserting insufficient
control must meet a strict requirement of proof. Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1059
(1986).
105. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 17:4. In Merry Hull & Co. v. Hi-Line
Co., 243 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the federal district court held that even
after the passage of several months after filing for bankruptcy, followed by one
more month after the trustee stopped filling orders for its product, and a delay
of several months before the purchaser of the trademark began production
under the mark, the owner did not abandon the trademark. Id. at 50. See also
Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.2d 35,45 n.47 (D.C. Cir.
1939) (business reorganization), cert denied,309 U.S. 684 (1940); Miller Brewing
Co. v. Oland's Breweries, Ltd., 548 F.2d 349 (C.C.P-.A 1976) (business reorganization).
It is fundamental that there be a going business and existing good will for
trademark protection to continue. Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe Inc., 203 F.
Supp. 777, 781 (M.D.N.C. 1962). However, merely closing down for a short period of time during bankruptcy is not a break in the operations of the business
sufficient to constitute an abandonment of the trademark. Id. Because bankruptcy does not destroy the good will of a company, the Bankruptcy Code
should allow the licensee to continue to use the trademark and maintain quality
so the public does not lose its benefit of the mark's informational value.
106. If a debtor has not, in a reasonable time, demonstrated an intention to
use the good will or associated trademarks, then a court will rule that the trademarks are abandoned. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 28 F.
Supp. 920 (W.D.N.Y. 1939); In re Jaysee Corset Co., 201 F. 779 (D.C.N.Y. 1911).
107. The Second Circuit, in Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prod.
Corp., 759 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985), makes it clear
that courts should not lightly declare an abandonment of a valuable mark
which an owner still intends to use because the public is not deceived. Id. at
1060. The court stated that good will does not disappear or completely lose
value overnight. Id.
108. See supra notes 104-07 for discussion of abandonment. The factors a
bankruptcy court should consider in deciding whether to allow the licensee's
continuation of its rights are: (a) whether the good will of the mark has not
dissipated; (b) whether the owner or potential assignee retains the intent to
produce or market within a reasonable time a product or service substantially
the same in nature and quality as that which the trademark formerly was associated; and (c) whether such resumption of operations will occur within a reasonable time under the circumstances. See Defiance Button, 759 F.2d at 1060.
The requirement that the bankruptcy court determines that the licensor or assignee intends to produce the same or similar product within a reasonable time
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ues using a trademark which the licensor intends to abandon during
bankruptcy, the licensee risks deceiving the public because the
mark no longer indicates a source of origin or a guarantee of
quality.
The amendment must also require the bankruptcy court to
make a preliminary finding that the licensee can maintain the quality control provisions in the absence of the licensor's actual direct
control, 109 before authorizing the licensee to elect to continue its
rights under the agreement. A licensee should be able to continue
using the mark so long as it does not actually diminish the original
approved quality of the goods or services, and the licensee's use does
not harm or deceive the public. Consumers' expectations of quality
and value are protected only so long as the licensee maintains the
licensor's quality standards 1 0
Quality control is the most important and most complex aspect
of this amendment, requiring a resolution of many factors. The
court should find the quality control requirement satisfied if, under
all the circumstances, the court finds that the adopted control measures are reasonably effective to ensure a licensee's maintenance of
an appropriate quality standard, even if control may be in the hands
of a third party or the licensee itself-' Because informal controls

is similar to a finding of adequate assurance of future performance. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C) (1988).
109. See infra note 111 for a discussion of the courts' reluctance to hold control requirements insufficient even in the absence of actual direct control.
Notwithstanding the courts' deference to quality control requirements, the
debtor-licensor may still find alternate means to police quality in a cost efficient
manner to prevent the loss of its trademark during reorganization. If a mark is
valuable, a debtor will most likely continue to control its licensee's use of the
mark or will arrange its sale. Putney, supra note 5, at 158.
110. Marks, supra note 1, at 654. The Marks article asserts that, so long as
the public obtains what it expects, there is no harm whether or not the licensor
exercises the quality controls. Id. Only if the licensee actually changes the
quality are the public's expectations disturbed. Id.
111. William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing
and Quality Contro 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99,102 (1980). One author notes that
courts are generally reluctant to examine the issue of actual control and thus
undercut the Lanham Act's control requirement. Seul, supra note 10, at 902.
Seul states that the right to challenge improper licensing has become largely
illusory as exemplified by the scarcity of cases which invalidate trademark
rights on the basis of a licensor's inadequate control. Id.
This conclusion is supported by a plethora of case law which does show that
courts have consistently upheld control systems or measures as sufficient in circumstances where actual control was not conclusively present. See Transgo,
Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp. 768 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1985) (control held sufficient where licensor manufactured 90% of automobile components licensee sold, although licensor never directly inspected or tested final
product and where association between licensor and licensee over ten years established basis for reliance on licensee's ability to maintain high quality standards), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); Land O'Lakes Creameries v.
Oconomowoc Canning, 330 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1964) (reliance on integrity of
a licensee is sufficient to fulfill the control requirement where a history of
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can adequately protect the public from a licensee's misuse of a
trouble-free manufacture provides basis for such reliance); Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart's Foods Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (reasonable degree of supervision and control over licensees present, despite the lack of evidence as to
the nature or frequency of inspections, where evidence showed that some sales
representatives visited their particular customers to inspect and observe the operations of the licensees); Embedded Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co.,
648 F. Supp. 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (license was not insufficient as a matter of law
and contained sufficient supervisory control where licensor relied on integrity
of licensee's president based on prior relationship); Hurricane Fence Co. v. A-1
Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 975, 986 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (sufficient control
found where licensor relied upon licensee's experience, licensee was corporation formed by two of the partners of licensor corporation, and the licensor and
licensee were both companies formed by four brothers); Accurate Merchandising, Inc. v. American Pacific, 186 U.S.P.Q. 197,200 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (control sufficient where the supervision of quality is reserved in a representative which the
licensor appointed); Syntex Lab., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (licensor's responsibility to supervise the quality of the product
was satisfied where licensee was subject to FDA regulations governing manufacturing practices, licensee was experienced in the product, and licensor inspected licensee's product during negotiations prior to the agreement), off'd,
437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971); Taffy Original Designs, Inc. v. Taffy's Inc., 161
U.S.P.Q. 707, 713 (N.D. Il. 1966) (degree of control is adequate where the president of licensor is sister of president of licensee, even though there is no formal
control); Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F.
Supp. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (reliance upon integrity of a licensee sufficient to
fulfill the control requirement where a history of trouble-free manufacture provides basis of such reliance), aff'd, 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964); Stockpot, Inc. v.
Stock Pot Restaurant, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 53, 60-61 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (control requirement found satisfied on basis of right to control in license agreement, experience of licensee, the licensee's maintenance of same quality of goods and
services, and licensor's opportunity to observe operations of business); Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Cameo Exclusive Prod., Inc., 170 U.S.P.Q. 596, 598 (T.T.A.B. 1971)
(right to control found sufficient to satisfy the control requirement).
In light of the case authority, one author has argued for a more flexible
standard of quality control than an actual control standard. See Marks, supra
note 1, at 650-57. Marks states that, although none of the cases clearly support
the proposition that quality control may be dispensed with in certain situations,
both logic and the practical needs of the market raise the question of whether
the trademark owner's direct and actual quality control is necessary. Id. at 650.
His scheme, however, requires the licensor to at least initiate the relationship
by specifying the quality of the goods to be produced in detail or by reference to
some objective standard. Id. at 653-54. Nonetheless, he favors a relaxed quality
control standard overall. Id. at 657. His proposal, however, recognizes that
standard licensing, which includes situations where the quality of a licensed
product may be important to the public or where the guaranty of quality function is a paramount importance, may not be able to support a flexible standard.
Id. at 655 n.47.
The Lanham Act requires that, for a related company to legitimately use a
license, the related company must not use the trademark in such a manner as to
deceive the public. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1988). A "related company" is defined as
"any person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant [owner]
... in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection
with which the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). Therefore, the licensor
must actually control the licensee: a right to control is not enough. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:17 C. But see Ideal Toy Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. at 598
(right to control found sufficient to satisfy the control requirement). However,
if the courts construe the control requirement in light of the purpose of
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trademark,11 2 a bankruptcy court could actually impose an informal
control requirement on the licensee such as requiring it to submit
samples and inspection reports to the licensor. The amount of control necessary to satisfy the preliminary finding would vary according to the facts particular to a given situation or product.1 13 The
question whether the quality control requirement is satisfied would
remain a question of fact n1 4 for the bankruptcy court to decide.
When a bankruptcy court is determining whether a licensee
can maintain quality standards in a case where the licensor has not
delegated the obligation to control quality to a third party," 5 the
bankruptcy court should establish whether the public can rely on
the licensee's maintenance of quality control. For example, a history of trouble-free manufacture may be the basis of reliance and
thus fulfill the quality control requirement." 6 If the quality control does actually cease, then a preliminary injunction would be appropriate to prevent harm or deception and to protect the debtor's
7
trademark."1
preventing deception of the public, then minimal procedures should be sufficient under the facts of a given licensing agreement.
112. Taffy Original Designs, Inc. v. Taffy's, Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 707, 713 (NO.
Ill. 1966). See Coolley, supra note 1, at 308. Coolley states that sufficient control "exists if the licensor specifies the various processes for producing the
goods under the mark and carefully monitors the licensee's product. This requirement for control can normally be satisfied by the licensee's submission of
samples of its goods to the licensor for quality approval." Id.
113. Id. "Intellectual property licensing arrangements are not generally
standardized. Rather, the particular transaction is the product of the circumstances of the licensor, the licensee, and other interested parties." S. REP.,
supranote 11, at 3. Furthermore, it is "not unusual for the license agreement to
be one of several agreements governing the working relationship between the
licensor and licensee." Id.
114. See Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358,367-68
(2nd Cir. 1959); Embedded Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co., 648 F.
Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
115. See Accurate Merchandising, Inc. v. American Pacific, 186 U.S.P.Q. 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
116. See Syntex Lab., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 45, 56
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971); Land O'Lakes Creameries v.
Oconomowoc Canning, 330 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1964). Reliance on the licensee's maintenance of quality standards is also more probable when the success
of the licensee's business depends upon the continued quality of his products.
But see 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:17 B, at 842 ("It is difficult to see how
the licensor can fulfill his duty to take reasonable steps to control quality
merely by leaving the job up to the licensee."). Courts have also validated licensing agreements in which the trademark was licensed along with the licensing of a patent. Comment, supra note 7, at 884. The theory is that because the
trademark continues to be associated with its traditional product and the patentee is able to supervise the proper use of the patent, no problem of public deception is likely to arise. Id.
117. The bankruptcy courts can issue any order necessary to stop a threat to
the property of a debtor. Lieb, supra note 11, at 328. Bankruptcy judges may
hear and determine "all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11... and may enter appropriate
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Because some quality control procedures may require a licensee to purchase goods and other materials exclusively from its licensor, the bankruptcy court must determine whether the licensee
could permissibly go elsewhere for these materials without deceiving the public or diminishing the quality of the goods. Because "tying arrangements"' 1 8 are not generally favored under unfair
competition law, it is not unusual for courts to allow a licensee to go
elsewhere for its materials."- 9 If, on the other hand, comparable
materials are unavailable from other sources and these materials
are necessary for substantial quality control procedures, 2 0 then the
bankruptcy court should refuse to authorize the licensee's option to
retain its rights under the license agreement.' 21 Furthermore, the
orders and judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988). Section 157(b)(2)(M) of
the Bankruptcy Code provides that a core proceeding includes "orders approving the use or lease of property." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(M). See Vylene Enters.
v. Naugles, Inc. (In re Vylene Enters.), 63 B.R. 900, 905 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)
(preliminary injunction to prohibit debtor from infringing franchisor's trademarks was core proceeding within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court);
Midas Int'l Corp. v. M & E Enters. (In re M & E Enters.), 23 BR. 820 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1982) (injunction issued to prevent debtor franchisee from operating
under the franchise agreement after franchisor properly terminated the
agreement).
118. An unlawful tying arrangement is an arrangement which conditions a
sale or lease of one product on the sale or lease of another separate product
from the same seller. General Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chem. & Oil, 786 F.2d
105,110 (2nd Cir. 1986). A company can justify tying arrangements in a number
of ways. First, a "new business" justification is available for short periods of
time. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Second, if a "marketing identity" purpose is required for preserving the distinctiveness, uniformity, and quality of a product
then the tying arrangement may be justifiable. Id. See also Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980) (McDonald's unique franchising system
did not amount to illegal tying arrangement where requirements were integral
components of the business method being franchised and made up a package
which made the franchise uniquely attractive to franchisees), cert denied, 451
U.S. 970 (1981).
119. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:19, at 847. It may have to be a business judgment for the licensee as to whether it can find comparable materials
from other sources because these materials may be more expensive.
120. See id.
121. Compare Seul, supra note 10, at 146. Seul proposes an alternate solution for situations where the services of the licensor may be of such great benefit to the licensee that continued operation without the performance is nearly
impossible. Id His proposal, modeled after Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy
Code dealing with collective bargaining agreements, requires the debtor-licensor to engage in renegotiation toward a mutually acceptable modified agreement. Id. Seul argues that this renegotiation would strike the proper balance
between the policies favoring the debtor's rejection and those favoring protection of related licensees from financial ruin. Id. The renegotiated agreement
would be one that facilitates the debtor's reorganization efforts while limiting
the impact on the licensee's business. Id.
Seul's proposal, however, does not strike the necessary balance. A debtorlicensor will not have the time or resources to negotiate new license agreements
with the many possible licensee's under its marketing or distribution system.
Reorganization would be slowed, not facilitated. Allowing the licensee to re-
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amendment must provide that a licensor has a right to review or
inspect the licensee's choice of comparable materials before the
bankruptcy court allows a licensee to use materials from other
sources.
Third, the amendment must require a licensor to deliver formulas, customer lists, goods, equipment, or other materials which it
promised a licensee under the license and which were in the licensor's possession at the time of filing for bankruptcy. These requirements are not substantially different from the treatment of the
other types of intellectual property under the current Bankruptcy
Code. A patent licensor must deliver the licensed property which is
2
in its possession at the time of filing the bankruptcy petition.3
However, it would be inequitable to require a debtor-licensor to
continue production or supply of purchasing materials. Thus, the
amendment must require the debtor-licensor to deliver only those
materials already in its possession at the time of rejection of the
license and must free the debtor-licensor from any obligation of future production and delivery. The licensee should then be required
to find comparable materials from other sources, if the bankruptcy
court has already authorized the licensee to do so. 1 s
Fourth, the amendment must require that a licensor refrain
from interfering with a licensee's trademark rights under the
agreement. The IPBPA contained this provision for the intellectual property defined under Section 101(52) of the Bankruptcy
Code.-24 The provision is likewise important for similar treatment
of trademark licenses. Otherwise, the licensee's option to continue
using the trademark would be meaningless because the trademark
owner could subsequently interfere with the licensee's use.
Fifth, a licensee must continue royalty paymentsm for its conview or inspect comparable materials or services by having the licensee submit
the samples to the licensor best promotes reorganization and strikes a proper
balance between the rights of the licensee, the rights of the licensor, and the
right of the public to be free from deception. There are some situations where
the support from the licensor may be too vital to protecting the public and
where the support is too specialized to be trusted to other sources. It is in these
situations where the licensee should not be allowed to continue using the mark
to protect against the risk of public deception.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3)(A) (1988).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
124. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(n)(2)(A) and (3)(B) (1988). The Senate report
noted that "[r]eference to noninterference by the trustee is not intended to imply that the rights of the licensee enjoy any protection from the trustee's avoiding powers under Section 544 to 549 of the Code." S. REP., supra note 11, at 11.
125. Courts should look to the substance of the transaction and not the label
when construing the term "royalty." H.R. REP., supra note 30, at 9. "The underlying nature of the payments must be considered. For example, payments
based on the use of the intellectual property or on a percentage of sales of end
products that incorporate or are derived from the intellectual property should
be treated as royalty payments." Id.
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tinued use of the trademark. 2 6 This provision guarantees that the
licensee will treat the contract as a full obligation. The provision
also maintains an income for the debtor for distribution to the unsecured creditors and avoids an unjust enrichment of the licensee.
Finally, the amendment must provide that the licensee's right
to continue use of the trademark will continue as long as the original agreement provided.m As under the IPBPA, the right to use
the trademark would continue through the periods in which the licensee would have had the right to renew the license. Allowing the
rights to continue as the parties had originally agreed, preserves the
licensee's expectations in its business planning.
In sum, this proposal maintains the Bankruptcy Code's policies
of encouraging both debtor rehabilitation and equality of distribution by requiring the continuation of royalties and by relieving the
licensor of its duties under the license agreement. The income from
continued royalty payments will compensate for any diminished
value to the estate's property that results from the existence of a
license agreement. Most trademark licenses benefit the estate
through royalty income from the licensees.Ms Thus, the licensee's
continued royalty payments under an amendment similar to the
IPBPA would not undermine the policies of payment to creditors
and facilitation of reorganization, because the estate will still maintain a source of income. Also, the proposal only calls for allowing
the licensee to continue its rights and duties under the license
agreement. The debtor-licensor would no longer be under any affirmative obligations by virtue of the license agreement and could
still focus its efforts on reorganization.
This amendment to the Bankruptcy Code is necessary to protect trademark licensees. 129 The amendment must allow the licen126. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B) (1988). Compare Seul, supra note 10, at 145
(suggesting that licensees should be entitled to withhold from royalty payments
an amount equal to the damages resulting from the failure of the licensor to
perform services that it otherwise would be obligated to perform). Allowing for
full payment of royalties and relegating the licensee to a pre-petition damages
claim best furthers the policy of reorganization and maximizes payment to creditors under the Bankruptcy Code.
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) (1988).
128. Putney, supranote 5, at 156. The costs involved with controlling quality
are usually less than the royalty payments. Id.
129. The following is a proposal for a draft of what the amendment could
potentially look like. The italicized provisions are the words which must be
added to Section 365. The word "stricken" must be deleted. The amendment
must first add "trademarks" and "service marks" to the definition of "intellectual property" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(52).
(n)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the
debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under
such contract may elect
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such
rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the
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see to elect to maintain its rights under the licensing agreement. If
licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms,
applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee
with another entity, or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under
such contract and under any agreement supplementary to such contract,
to such intellectual property (including any embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law),
subject to paragraph(1)(C) of this section if the licensee is a licensee of a
right to a trademark, service mark, or similar intellectual property, as
such rights existed immediately before the case commenced, for
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the
licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law;
(C) in the case of a licensee of a right to a trademark,service mark,
orsimilar intellectualproperty, to retainits rights as provide i in paragraph (1)(B) contingent upon the following determinationsmade by the
bankruptcy court, prior to authorizingthe licensee to retainits rights:
(i) that the trusteedoes not intend to abandonthe trademark,service mark,or similar intellectual property under applicable nonbankruptcy law or that it does intend to continue use in commerce, either
personally or through assignmen within a reasonabletime, a product
substantially the same in nature and quality as that which the trademark, service mark,or similar intellectualpropertyformerly was as-

sociated,
(ii) that the licensee can maintain the reasonable quality control
provisionsprovidedin such contractand can maintainan appropriate
quality standardin the absence of the trustee's actual direct control.
The bankruptcy court can make any order necessary to impose an informal control requirement or otherwise require the licensee to perform measures ensuring adequate control; and
(iii) in the case where quality control may requirematerialsto be
obtained exclusively from the licensor, that the licensee can guarantee
the supply of comparablematerialsfrom anothersource,and subject to
a right of review and inspection of the licensor. If comparablematerials are unavailablefrom other sources and these materialsare necessaryfor substantialquality control, then the bankruptcy court should
refuse to authorize the licensee'soption to retainits rights as provided
in section (B) of this paragraph.
(2) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph
(1)(B) of this subsection, under such contract
(A) the trustee shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights;
(B) the licensee shall make all royalty payments due under such
contract...
(3) If the licensee elects to retain its rights.. .then on the written request of the licensee the trustee shall
(A) to the extent provided in such contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, provide to the licensee any intellectual
property (including such embodiment) or in the case of a trademark,service mark, or similar intellectual property,goods, parts,customer lists,
formulas, standards,or any similarmaterial held by the trustee; and
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such
contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including such embodiment) from another entity; and
(C) in the case of a trademark,service mark, or similarintellectual
property, not interfere with the right of the licensee to find comparable
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the licensee elects to maintain the rights, then the bankruptcy court
must determine whether the licensor intends to abandon the mark
and whether the licensee can maintain the quality control procedures in the absence of the licensor's actual direct control. If
purchasing requirements are necessary for substantial quality control, and comparable materials are not available, then the bankruptcy court must not authorize a licensee's option to retain its
rights under the license agreement. If the court then determines
that the licensee may continue exercising its rights under the license, the debtor-licensor must deliver the equipment and other
materials which were in its possession prior to filing bankruptcy.
The amendment to the Bankruptcy Code must also require that the
debtor-licensor refrain from interfering with the licensee's trademark rights. Finally, the amendment must require the licensee to
continue royalty payments for the licensee's continued use of the
trademark. As a result, this amendment will provide a more equitable treatment of trademark licensees under the Bankruptcy Code.
CONCLUSION

Section 365 threatens economic and technological development
by allowing a debtor-licensor to reject its trademark license. A
trademark licensee risks the total abrogation of its right to use a
trademark, a valuable property right. Congress has not announced
any compelling reasons for excluding trademarks from the protection afforded other forms of intellectual property. Because the law
and policy of trademark licensing agreements are compatible with
other intellectual property licensing agreements, Congress must
amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide trademark licensees similar
treatment in the bankruptcy courts. Until Congress amends the
Code, licensees must continue to bear the economic burden of
trademark owners' mismanagement and thus needlessly risk the
loss of their investments.
David M. Jenkins

materials if authorized by the bankruptcy court as provided in paragraph (C)(iii) section (n)(1).

